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in holding that the traditional free-will theodicy is adequate and illuminating. 
But, as far as I can see, Griffin does not even attempt to address the issue in 
this manner. And hence I see no reason to grant that he has established the 
implausibility of this theodicy. 
Overall, though, as I stated earlier, I believe that most philosophers will 
find this book to be a valuable addition to the ongoing discussion of the 
problem of evil. 
Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, edited by Michael D. 
Beaty. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990. Pp. vii, 380. 
$34.95 Cloth; $14.95 Paper. 
TERRY J. CHRISTLIEB, Georgetown, Texas. 
This is the fifth volume in the Library of Religious Philosophy series. It 
contains a reprint of Alvin Plantinga's "Advice to Christian Philosophers" 
(Faith and Philosophy, July, 1984) followed by thirteen essays which show 
how to follow part of that advice. The various authors attempt to resolve 
important philosophical problems by examining them in light of uniquely 
theistic (and often Christian) assumptions. To the extent that the essays are 
successful they not only help with the philosophical problems but also reveal 
the explanatory relevance and usefulness of theistic beliefs. Even when they 
are not so successful, the essays display clearly the quality of contemporary 
Christian philosophy. The proposals contained in the articles are focused and 
readable, and most of all they are creative, repeatedly offering interesting 
new angles on the problems under discussion. 
Excluding "Advice to Christian Philosophers," four essays each are de-
voted to epistemology and ethics, and five concern metaphysics. Four of the 
essays appeared in volume 4, number 4 of Faith and Philosophy (October 
1987) and so may already be familiar to readers of this journal; the other nine 
were written for this volume. The volume also contains a fine introduction 
to the essays by editor Michael D. Beaty. 
The epistemology section contains essays aimed at showing that a theistic 
perspective yields a better understanding of probability and of epistemic 
justification, an essay which explores the compatibility of reliabilism and 
theism, and one which develops a theory of rationality applicable to both 
scientific and religious belief systems. Two of the metaphysics essays are 
concerned with counterfactuals. The first focuses on those with impossible 
antecedents and leads to a proposed extension of "the standard analysis" of 
counterfactuals. The second argues that "natural laws" are grounded in coun-
terfactuals of freedom. The section also contains interesting articles on the 
ground of mathematical objects, the mind/body problem, and free will. The 
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ethics essays are more nearly focused on a single theme. Two of them support 
the viability of the Divine Command Theory and two argue against it. I 
cannot, of course, hope to comment on all of the essays. Instead I will try to 
convey something about the content of the volume by posing some questions 
about one essay from each of the main sections. 
In "What if the Impossible Had Been Actual?" Linda Zagzebski offers "an 
a priori argument that it is possible that there is some proposition which is 
impossible, but not self-contradictory" (p. 174f). If the argument is sound 
then we have a reason to suppose that some fine-tuning of the semantics for 
counterfactuals is in order. Unfortunately the argument is not convincing. 
Zagzebski does not consider objections to the argument in the essay, but it 
seems to me that premise 4 (p. 174) is the weak link. It states: 
The proposition 'There is a proposition which is false in all possible worlds 
but does not entail a contradiction' is not self-contradictory. 
This is introduced as an assumption-the only one besides an assumption for 
reductio-but no defense of the assumption is offered and there is some 
reason to think it false. We do know that many necessarily false propositions 
entail contradictions, for example "God is not good" entails "The being who 
is good is not good" or the like, and we also know that it sometimes takes a 
bit of work to derive an explicit contradiction (as Zagzebski requires, p. 174). 
So it is far from obvious that we should accept the truth of this premise. 
It also seems to me that the intuitions that Zagzebski wants to account for 
are more easily understood in another way which does not require us to 
subdivide the "category" of the impossible. She is "strongly inclined" (p. 
167) to say that "if God did not exist, then matter would not exist" is non-
trivially true and that "if God did not exist, matter would exist" is false, rather 
than that both are trivially true. I think that the inclination is the result of not 
keeping the truth (assuming that it is true) that God is a necessary being firmly 
in view. Clearly, if Melba has children then "if Melba did not exist, her 
children would not exist" is non-trivially true, but Melba is a contingent being. 
Anyone really serious about the claim that God exists necessarily must ignore 
the formal similarity of the sentences involving Melba's and God's nonexistence. 
In "Because God Says So" Carlton D. Fisher rejects the divine command 
theory and argues that doing so does not undermine God's sovereignty. His 
major reason for rejecting the theory is apparently his belief that it makes 
claims like the following non-trivially true: If God had commanded us to 
torture innocents, then it would have been right to do so (p. 360). Note that 
he here presupposes something like the Zagzebski view questioned above. 
But if, as he argues, God does not create moral rules by his commands how 
do they arise, and how is God's sovereignty assured? 
Fisher's proposal is that God still controls the content of morality by de-
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ciding what sorts of creatures to create (p. 362). God creates us, then recog-
nizes what is best for us and proposes commands for us accordingly. Thus he 
is still sovereign, but the things commanded are not dependent on his will 
but merely on his epistemic perfection (p. 369). Here it is interesting to 
compare Fisher's position with that presented in Philip L. Quinn's "An Ar-
gument for Divine Command Ethics," also in this volume. Although one 
defends and one attacks "divine command theory" it looks as though their 
positions are actually compatible. Quinn presents a persuasive argument for 
the conclusion that most deontological states of affairs (e.g., telling the truth 
being obligatory, lying being impermissible) are metaphysically dependent 
on being willed by God (p. 297f). The dependence he has in view is, roughly, 
a causal contribution of God's willing to the existence of the state of affairs. 
Quinn's argument leaves open the allowable "mechanisms" of this contribu-
tion. Because a range of allowable processes are left open the process de-
scribed by Fisher can be viewed as an option compatible with Quinn's claims. 
Fisher tells us that God wills the existence of certain creatures which thereby 
determines the existence of certain moral rules. Thus even on Fisher's view 
God's willing makes a causal contribution to the existence of moral rules. As 
a result, even Fisher's view is a divine command theory in Quinn's sense, 
although Fisher rejects the name. 
Fisher seems to be presupposing that a "divine command theory" requires 
an act of willing moral rules that is distinct from the willing that brings about 
the existence of the creatures who are subject to those rules. As a result he 
does not see his view as a divine command theory. But since there is no 
compelling reason for theists to adopt the requirement mentioned I am in-
clined to side with Quinn here and suggest that Fisher's view is, after all, a 
divine command theory. 
Fisher's view that morality is in a sense secondary to creatures like human 
beings also raises the question of what God's primary aim in creating might 
be. Maybe it is certain creatures, with a certain morality as a by-product. That 
is Fisher's view, and perhaps it is the correct view for Christian theists. But 
there are other options. Maybe God's primary aim is a certain moral order, 
with certain creatures being the necessary means to that order's existence. Or 
maybe he aims simultaneously at the existence of both the creatures and the 
moral order, without priority. So perhaps Fisher's desire to reject divine 
command theory has also been influenced by a substantive theological as-
sumption about the relative unimportance of morality as compared to (other) 
creatures. But even that assumption does not entail that morality could not 
be ultimately the result of God's will. 
Plantinga's "Justification and Theism" uses the notion that humans have 
been designed by God to be in God's image to clarify the notion of epistemic 
justification. God is a knower, so it is reasonable to suppose that we have 
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been designed to be knowers as well. Thus, Planting a argues, a necessary 
condition for knowing will include the proper functioning of our epistemic 
faculties-functioning as God designed them to function. A second necessary 
condition will be that the faculties operate in an environment of the sort God 
designed them to function in. So Plantinga arrives at these conditions through 
plausible inferences from central theistic doctrines. 
Plantinga then contends that these conditions are not together sufficient. 
The reason is that we know from experience that some beliefs produced by 
properly functioning faculties in an appropriate environment have more 
"positive epistemic status" than others. It seems to me that at this point 
Plantinga's project runs into trouble. For at this point he begins to offer us 
alleged details of God's design plan. For example, he suggests that we can 
observe that we have a stronger "impulse" to accept beliefs with more posi-
tive epistemic status than ones with less. He then immediately concludes that 
the match between degree of impulse and degree of positive epistemic status 
is a feature of God's design plan (p. 49). But we have no reason to accept 
that conclusion even if (as seems doubtful) it is true that such an impulse 
exists and also bears an "appropriate functional relationship" to degrees of 
positive epistemic status (p. 49). First, because the notion that that is a feature 
of the design plan cannot be inferred from any common theistic doctrines. 
Second, the doctrine of the fall stands in the way of Plantinga's ready as-
sumption that we are so designed. The fall doctrine suggests that we are not 
functioning properly in a proper environment, but unfortunately does not 
specify the nature of the breakdown in any detail. At least some schools 
within Christianity have suggested that the loss of original design perfection 
extends to our epistemic faculties. So, we cannot simply assume that an 
observed impulse represents a feature of proper functioning. And, more gen-
erally, it seems that we must remain agnostic about what the details of the 
design plan are if they are not spelled out in received theistic doctrines. 
Although my brief discussion has mostly taken the form of raising objec-
tions I certainly do not want to leave the impression that the volume is not 
valuable reading. I profited very much from a study of these essays, and I 
hope that many others working in philosophy and religion will also explore 
them. The book could also be used for an advanced survey course in philoso-
phy of religion because of the wide variety of topics addressed and the quality 
of the work. It is another fine addition to this series. 
